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I. INTRODUCTION

On January 5, 1995, four firefighters died while fighting a
fire at the Mary Pang Products, Inc. warehouse in Seattle, King
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County, Washington.! Fire investigators later determined that
the fire had been intentionally set.' Martin Shaw Pang ("Pang"),
son of the warehouse owners, became a suspect.' A fugitive warrant was issued for his arrest,4 and he fled to Brazil. On March 3,
1995, the King County Prosecuting Attorney charged Pang with
four counts of murder in the first degree," and a warrant was issued for his arrest.
The defendant was arrested in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on
March 16, 1995.6 On March 17, 1995, the Prosecuting Attorney
of King County added a charge of arson in the first degree.' In
July 1995 the United States requested Brazil to extradite Pang
to the State of Washington for trial on four counts of murder in
the first degree and one count of arson in the first degree.' On
December 18, 1995, the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil granted
extradition on the single count of arson in the first degree, but
not on the four counts of murder in the first degree.' On February 28, 1996, Pang was surrendered by Brazil into the custody of
the United States. He was immediately returned to the United
States and the State of Washington.1"
The United States appealed to the Federal Supreme Court of
Brazil seeking clarification of the extradition order. 12 The United
States argued in the appeal that the arson statute in the State of
Washington was equivalent only to Article 250 (simple arson) of
the Brazil Penal Code, which penalizes only the arson itself, not
the resulting deaths.' The appeal for clarification further argued
that the Washington arson statute did not punish the crime in
the same way that Article 258 (aggravated arson) of the Brazilian Penal Code 5 would.' 6 On March 27, 1996, the Federal Su1.
(1997).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

State v. Pang, 940 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Wash. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 628
Pang, 940 P.2d at 1295.
Id. at 1295.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1296.
Id.
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1305.
Id.
Id.
PENAL CODE [C.P.] art. 250 (Braz.).
Pang, 940 P.2d at 1305.
PENAL CODE [C.P.] art. 258 (Braz.).
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preme Court of Brazil rejected the appeal, holding that its original decision required no clarification and that it was legally impossible, under Brazilian procedural law, to reconsider the merits
of the case because there was no contradiction or obvious error in
the decision. 7 On November 12, 1996, the Honorable Larry A.
Jordan, King County Superior Court, denied Pang's motion to
dismiss or sever the murder charges from the arson charge,
holding that because of Brazil's implicit waiver of any objection it
could have made to prosecution for murder, the defendant lacked
standing to assert a violation of the extradition order issued by
the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil and he could be tried for all
counts, including the four counts of murder.18 On December 4,
1996, Pang filed a motion for direct discretionary review by the
Supreme Court of the State of Washington, which was granted on
February 6, 1997.19 The Supreme Court of Washington held that:
(1) defendant had standing to object to violation of the terms of
the extradition order issued by the Federal Supreme Court of
Brazil; (2) Brazil did not waive any objection it could have made
to prosecution for murder; (3) the specialty doctrine prohibited
the State of Washington from prosecuting defendant for crimes
excluded in the extradition order; (4) the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United States of
Brazil prohibited the State of Washington from prosecuting defendant for crimes not included in the extradition order; and (5)
the State of Washington was obligated to follow the decision of
the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil." The State of Washington
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, but on December 15, 1997,
the Court denied certiorari.2 1 This Note argues that the Washington Supreme Court wrongly decided the issue in Pang of whether
the State of Washington may prosecute Pang for the felony murder given that Brazil extradited him only for arson. The State of
Washington Supreme Court's decision in Pang seriously transformed the United States approach to extradition. In doing so,
the Pang court placed additional limitations on post-extradition
prosecution and ignored Ninth Circuit case law. The decision se-

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Pang, 940 P.2d at 1306.
Id. at 1306-07.
Id. at 1312-13.
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1325.
State v. Pang, 940 P.2d 1293 (Wash. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 628 (1997).
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riously impacts future cases involving interpretation of extradition treaties between the United States and other countries.
By granting extradition only on the basis of the Washington
arson statute, the Brazilian Supreme Court's decision in this case
will prevent U.S. authorities from prosecuting Pang for the
deaths of four firefighters that resulted from the arson. Under
the Pang court's decision, the deaths of four innocent victims will
go unpunished, even though the laws of both Brazil and Washington recognize arson resulting in death as a more serious crime
than arson alone. Thus, rather than furthering the ends of justice, the Washington Supreme Court essentially immunized Pang
from any liability for the deaths he allegedly caused. Because
Pang's prosecution for murder would be consistent with our
treaty obligations toward Brazil, Pang should stand trial for
murder and arson.
Part II of this Case Note examines the practice and legal nature of extradition under international law. Part III discusses
the majority's reasoning and the emphatic dissents in State v.
Pang. Part IV specifically analyzes and rejects the Pang decision
and its treatment of the issues in light of the history of extradition, prior case law, and the opposing interpretation. Finally,
Part V concludes that the Washington Supreme Court was wrong
in construing the specialty doctrine as implying additional limitations on post-extradition prosecution.

I.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXTRADITION

Throughout its history, extradition has remained a system
consisting of several processes by which one state surrenders to
another state a person accused of or convicted of a select number
of crimes.22 The requested state grants the extradition of the individual to allow the state seeking extradition to prosecute the
fugitive offender for the crimes alleged to have been committed
against the laws of the requesting state.2 3

22. "Extradition is the process by which a person charged with or convicted of a
crime under the law of one state is arrested in another state and returned for trial or
punishment." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 474 at 556-57 (1987).
23. ALONSO GOMEz-ROBLEDO VERDUZCO, EXTRADICION EN DERECHO INTERNATIONAL
ASPECTOS Y TENDENCIAS RELEVANTES 15 (1996). See also 21 TX. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw §

1765 (1982).
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The practice originated in early Middle Eastern and eastern
civilizations such as the Egyptian and Chinese.24 In the early
days of the practice, delivery of individuals to a requesting state
was usually based on pacts or treaties, but it also occurred on the
basis of reciprocity and comity. 5 Surrendering a person sought
by another state did not necessarily mean that the extraditee
was a fugitive criminal." In fact, from the origins of the practice
until the late eighteenth century, such persons were sought for
2
political reasonsY.
However, extradition, which at one time had
manifested itself as a practice designed for the preservation of
the political and religious interests of states, gradually developed
into an international means of cooperation in the suppression of
crime. 21
In contemporary practice, the duty to extradite only by virtue of a treaty has become the prevalent practice among states,
though reciprocity and comity still exist as legal bases relied
upon by some states."5 Most common law systems have traditionally required a treaty,"0 whereas the less formally demanding
civil law systems rely on national legislation, reciprocity and
comity, as well as treaties. 1 Certain South American states such
as Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil, occasionally recognize a legal duty to extradite in the absence of a treaty.2
Extradition treaties and legislation provide the principles
and rules of extradition and dictate the existence of an obligation
to surrender fugitive criminals."2 The framework of extradition
thus consists largely of binding bilateral or multilateral international commitments. 4 The viability of these instruments is
therefore of great importance in the present state of extradition

24. M. CHERIF BAssioUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 1 (3rd rev. ed. 1996).
25. Id. at 1. Comity is defined as a willingness on the part of one nation to grant a
privilege to another nation, not as a matter of right but out of deference and good will.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1979). See also OPPENHEiM's INTERNATIONAL LAW

50, n.1 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
26. BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 3.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. See also I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (1971).
31. BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 16.
32. Id. at 7. See also SHEARER, supra note 30, at 26.
33. SHEARER, supra note 30, at 22.

34. Id. at 23.

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1

law and practice. 5 In the absence of a treaty, countries have no
legal duty to grant extradition.36 While a requested country may
surrender individuals to other countries solely out of comity,
comity is not binding since it is an act of courtesy rather than
custom.

37

In fact, the general practice confirms that extradition

is not looked upon as an absolute international duty, and if a
country wishes to ensure the surrender of its own criminals it
must enter into extradition treaties with other countries.3 8 It
therefore follows that no better way exists of securing clear and
firm obligations to extradite, than that of extradition treaties.
The United States and Brazil entered into the Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America and the United
States of Brazil with the desire of making more effective the cooperation of their respective countries in the repression of
crime." State v. Pang is the first published decision that considers the United States-Brazil extradition treaty.' This Note analyzes Pang with a focus on the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the specialty doctrine.4'
III. STATE V. PANG
A. The Majority Decision
On July 31, 1997, the Supreme Court of Washington, sitting
en banc, held that the State of Washington was prohibited from
prosecuting Petitioner Martin Shaw Pang for the four counts of
murder in the first degree because Brazil had extradited him
35. Id.
36. GOMEZ-ROBLEDO VERDUZCO, supra note 23, at 15. See also United States v.
Rauscher, 199 U.S. 407, 412 (1886) (stating that according to principles of international
law, states are not obligated to surrender fugitives to the state in which their crimes were
committed).
37. BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 17.
38. SHEARER, supra note 30, at 27.

39. The Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America and the United
States of Brazil became effective on December 17, 1964. Treaty of Extradition Between
the United States of America and the United States of Brazil, Jan. 13, 1961, U.S.-Braz.,
15 U.S.T. 2093.
40. State v. Pang, 940 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Wash. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 628
(1997).
41. In the United States, the specialty doctrine dictates that prosecution of an extradited person may go forward if the crime charged is one included in the applicable
treaty as well as in the request for extradition. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477 cmt. a (1987).
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only for arson in the first degree.42 The court found that the
Treaty of Extradition between the United States and Brazil prohibited the State of Washington from prosecuting Pang for
crimes not authorized in the extradition order. 3
The court acknowledged that the doctrine of specialty was
incorporated into the Treaty of Extradition through Article XXI."
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the specialty doctrine
prohibited the State of Washington from prosecuting Pang for
crimes excluded in the extradition order.42
Consequently, the court ruled that the State of Washington
could proceed to trial only on Count I of the second amended information that charged Pang with the crime of arson in the first
degree. '
Finally, in three additional holdings, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that: (1) Pang had standing to object to violation by the State of Washington of the terms of the order of extradition issued by the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil; (2) Brazil did not explicitly or implicitly waive any objection it could
have made to prosecution by the State of Washington of Pang for
murder in the first degree; and (3) the State of Washington was
obligated to follow the decision of the Federal Supreme Court of
Brazil which granted extradition only on the arson count.47
B. The Dissents
Chief Justice Durham, writing for the four dissenting justices, strongly disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the
United States-Brazil extradition treaty and its rulings concerning the application of the specialty doctrine.4" Judge Durham ar42. Pang, 940 P.2d at 1325.
43. Id. at 1325. The court clearly erred in its interpretation of the United StatesBrazil extradition treaty, which treaty expressly permits prosecution for offenses included
in the extradition request. Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America
and the United States of Brazil, supra note 39, art. XXI, 15 U.S.T. 2093. Article XXI
reads in pertinent part: "A person extradited by virtue of the present Treaty may not be
tried or punished by the requesting State for any crime or offense committed prior to the
request for his extradition, other than that which gave rise to the request. ..
44. Pang, 940 P.2d at 1325.
45. Id. at 1325.
46. Id. at 1325-26.
47. Id. at 1325.
48. Id. at 1326 (Durham, J., dissenting).
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gued that the plain language of the treaty of extradition expressly permitted prosecution for offenses included in the extradition request.49 Judge Durham further maintained that the
majority erroneously concluded that the doctrine of specialty
prohibited the State of Washington from prosecuting Pang for
anything other than the arson count for which he was extradited." Judge Durham noted that the majority's conclusion was
based on a misunderstanding of the specialty doctrine and was
inconsistent with the vast weight of authority, which holds that
the scope of any specialty limitations on prosecution is determined solely by the language of the applicable treaty.5 '

IV. ANALYSIS
Pang is a narrow interpretation of the United States-Brazil
extradition treaty and the specialty doctrine. The Washington
Supreme Court's decision to impose additional limitations on
post-extradition prosecution contravened the State of Washington's unambiguous rights under the treaty.
A. Applicable State of Washington Law
Pang was charged in the King County Superior Court in
Count I with arson in the first degree, a class A felony, under
RCW 9A.48.020(1)(a) and (d) and in Counts II-V with four counts
first degree, a class A felony, under RCW
of murder in the
2
9A.32.030( 1)(c).5

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.020 (West 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.32.030 (West 1988). 9A.48.020(1)(a) and (d) and 9A.32.030 (1)(c) reads in pertinent
part:
9A.48.020(1)(a) and (d) Arson in the first degree
(1) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree if he knowingly and maliciously:
(a) Causes a fire or explosion which is manifestly dangerous to any human
life, including firemen; or....
(d) Causes a fire or explosion on property valued at ten thousand dollars or
more with intent to collect insurance proceeds.
(2) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.
9A.32.030. Murder in the first degree
(1) A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
(c) He or she commits.. .the crime of.. .(4) arson in the first or second degree... and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime or in immediate
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Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, RCW 9.94A.310,
arson in the first degree has a seriousness score of VIII." If convicted of arson in the first degree, Pang would be subject to a
standard sentence range of 21 to 27 months."' However, the trial
court in Pang suggested that under RCW 9.94A.390, a court may,
in its discretion, impose an aggravated exceptional sentence
above the standard range if statutory criteria are met.55 In this
respect, the trial court's error was to presuppose that the firefighters' deaths could be used as aggravating factors justifying
the imposition of an exceptional sentence. Indeed, as the trial
court pointed out, the Brazilian Supreme Court assumed that
Pang could be as severely punished whether the deaths served as
the basis for an aggravated sentence or separate felony murder
sentences .56

Nevertheless, the "real facts" concept of RCW 9.94A.370(2)
would prohibit the trial court from considering the firefighters'
deaths as aggravating factors in sentencing.5 7 The real facts doctrine excludes consideration during sentencing of uncharged
crimes or charged crimes which were later dismissed." The firefighters' deaths cannot be used to impose an exceptional sentence
because they establish an essential element of first degree felony
murder, 9 a separate and more serious crime than arson.
The Washington Supreme Court's ruling dismissing the
murder charges and the trial court's inability to consider the arson deaths otherwise gave the trial court no choice but to enter a

flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants.. .(2) Murder in the first degree is a
class A felony.
53. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.310 (West 1988); Pang,940 P.2d at 1315.
54. Pang, 940 P.2d at 1315.
55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390 (West 1988); Pang,940 P.2d at 1315.
56. Pang, 940 P.2d at 1315-16.
57. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.370 (West 1988). This section reads in pertinent
part:
"(2).. .Facts that establish the elements of a more serious crime or additional crimes
may not be used to go outside the presumptive sentence range except upon stipulation or
when specifically provided for in RCW 9.94A390(2)(c), (d), and (e).'
These statutory exceptions, which are for certain major economic offenses or series of offenses, major violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, or sexual abuse, would
not apply in Pang.
58. Accord State v. Houf, 841 P.2d 42, 46 (Wash. 1992).
59. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030 (West 1988).
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standard-range sentence for first degree arson, that is, approximately two years.60
B. Petitioner'sStanding
The United States' circuit courts are divided on the issue of
standing to assert violations of the terms of an extradition order.
Some courts hold that an extraditee has standing to raise any
objections to post-extradition proceedings which the requested
nation might have raised, subject to the limitation that the rendering country may waive its right to object to a treaty violation. 1 Others have left the question of standing unanswered,
with some suggesting approval of the rule favoring standing.62
Still, a minority of the courts deny standing absent affirmative
protest by the requested state." In failing to grant certiorari in
Pang, the United States Supreme Court allowed the circuits to
remain divided.
The trial court in Pang held that Brazil had implicitly
waived objection by not objecting when it had the opportunity to
do so, therefore, Pang lacked standing to raise objections to the
violation of the terms of the extradition order. 4 However, the
60. Pang,940 P.2d at 1315 (citing RCW 9.94A.310).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1575 (llth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 341 (1995); United States v. Fowlie, 24 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086 (1995). See also, Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385, 389 (8th
Cir. 1989).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 767 n.6 (1st Cir. 1995)
("[W]hile we take no view of the [standing] issue, we realize that there are two sides to the
story, and the side that favors individual standing has much to commend it." (citations
omitted)); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886) (referring to the doctrine of
specialty as a "right conferred upon persons brought from a foreign country" under extradition proceedings); United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 504 U.S. 655, 659-60 (1992) (suggesting the continuing validity of the Rauscher decision). See also, United States v. Sensi,
879 F.2d 888, 892 n.1 (D.C.Cir. 1989) ("The authority on this [standing] point is uncertain.") (reserving the question of standing). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477 cmt. b (1987) ("While the case law
in the United States and elsewhere is not consistent, it appears that the person extradited
has standing to raise the issue of variance between the extradition request and the indictment by motion during or in advance of his trial.").
63. See, e.g., Fioconni v. Att'y Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 481 (2nd Cir. 1972). The Second,
Fifth and Sixth Circuits allow a defendant to raise a specialty violation only when the nation from which he or she has been extradited formally protests. The rule is otherwise in
the Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. See generally Mary-Rose Papandrea, Comment,
Standing to Allege Violations of the Doctrine of Specialty: An Examination of the Relationship between the Individual and the Sovereign, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1187, 1196-1202 (1995).
64. Pang, 940 P.2d at 1317.
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State of Washington's implicit waiver argument was based on an
erroneous reading of Brazil's Justice Minister Nelson A. Jobim's
letter of September 26, 1996 to United States Attorney General
Janet Reno.65 The State of Washington claimed that this letter
indicated that Brazil did not object to Pang's prosecution for four
counts of murder in the first degree."' Nevertheless, nothing in
the letter supported such a conclusion. 7 The letter from Minister
of State Jobim simply stated that Pang was extradited to stand
trial "for the crime of arson in the first degree, resulting in four68
deaths and the consequences thereof under United States law."
Additionally, the State of Washington's argument that Justice
Minister Jobim waived objection on behalf of Brazil failed because Minister Jobim lacked the power to waive objections to
post-extradition prosecution. 9 Under Brazil's three-branch government system, the Judicial Branch alone is responsible for interpreting treaties," and the Federal Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to rule on any extradition request by a foreign
nation.71 Accordingly, the Executive Branch may not limit the
scope of rulings made by the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil,
the highest authority of an independent branch of government."
Consequently, as stated by Minister of State for Justice Nelson
A. Jobim, any interpretative statements made by the Executive

65. Id. at 1317-18.
66. Id. at 1317.
67. Id.
68. Id.at 1312.
69. Id. at 1311-12.
70. BRAz. CONST. ch. III, § II, art.102(IH)(b). Art. 102(III)(b) provides:
The Supreme Federal Court is responsible, essentially, for safeguarding the
Constitution, and it is within its competence:
(III) to judge, on extraordinary appeal, cases decided in a sole or last instance, when the decision appealed:
(b) declares a treaty or a federal law unconstitutional...
Once treaties are incorporated into Brazil's domestic legal system, they are
equivalent to federal statutes. See BRAZ. CONST. ch. III, § III, art.105(III)(a).
Art. 105(III)(a) provides:
The Superior Court of Justice has the competence to:
(III) judge, on special appeal, the cases decided, in a sole or last instance, by
the Federal Regional Courts or by the courts of the states, of the Federal District and Territories, when the decision appealed:
(a) is contrary to a treaty or a federal law, or denies it effectivenes....
71. BRAZ. CONST. ch. III, § II, art.102(I)(g). Art.102(I)(g) provides: "The Supreme
Federal Court is responsible, essentially, for safeguarding the Constitution, and it is
within its competence: (I) to institute legal proceeding and trial, in the first instance, of:
(g) extradition requested by a foreign state...."
72. Pang, 940 P.2d at 1311-12.
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Branch regarding the content of rulings handed down by the
Federal Supreme Court would be unenforceable."
While some federal courts have declined to address whether
an extraditee has standing to object to the violation of the terms
of the extradition order, and others have questioned the issue,
the prevailing rule is that an extraditee may raise any objection
the surrendering state could make, as long as that country has
not waived its right to object.74
Since Brazil did not implicitly or explicitly waive its right to
make post-extradition objections to the prosecution of Pang by
the State of Washington, the Washington Supreme Court found
that Pang had standing to assert limitations on his
post-extradition prosecution.75
C. The Court's Misunderstandingof the Specialty
Doctrine
In the absence of a treaty, the obligation of one country to
surrender a fugitive to another has never been recognized as a
principle of international law, but as a principle of international
comity. 76

Many nations, including the United States, have en-

tered into extradition treaties to facilitate the surrender and
prosecution of fugitives.77 Extradition treaties usually include
provisions that limit prosecution for separate crimes unrelated to
the extradition request.78 Such limitations on post-extradition
prosecution are referred to as the specialty doctrine and serve to
guard against indiscriminate prosecution, especially for political
crimes.79 However, there are variations of the specialty doctrine.
In the most restrictive version of the specialty doctrine, some
treaties of extradition prohibit prosecution for any offenses other
than those for which extradition is specifically granted." It was
73. Id. at 1312.
74. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1355 (9th Cir. 1991)
("Our decisions involving the principle of specialty make clear that in those cases at least
the person extradited may raise whatever objections the rendering country might have.")
(citing United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986)).
75. Pang,940 P.2d at 1317.
76. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886).
77. SHEARER, supra note 30, at 21.

78. See Fioconni v. Att'y Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 481 (2nd Cir. 1972).
79. Id. at 481 (citing Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 419-20).
80. See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 423-24.
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this version of the doctrine that the Supreme Court applied in
United State v. Rauscher,8" and the rule that the court in Pang
erroneously suggested is implied in every extradition treaty.8 2
In Rauscher, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the treaty of extradition between the United
States and England prohibited prosecution of the extraditee for a
crime other than that for which he was extradited. 2 This was
the first case in which the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of specialty. In Rauscher, an American merchant ship officer had been extradited from England under an extradition
treaty, to be charged with the murder of a crew member." He
was subsequently convicted of assault, and of inflicting cruel and
unusual punishment, neither of which were crimes listed as extraditable offenses in the treaty. 5 The court in Rauscher held
that a person who had been brought within the jurisdiction of a
court by virtue of an extradition treaty can only be tried for one
of the offenses described in that treaty and for the offense with
which he was charged in the extradition proceedings.' The court
in Rauscher based its conclusion upon the terms and history of
the extradition treaty with England, the practice of nations in
regards to extradition treaties, the case law from the states, and
the writings of jurists.7
Although some nations follow the strict interpretation of the
specialty doctrine, the permissive approach, which is generally
followed in the United States, permits the prosecution to go forward if the charge is based on the same facts as those included in
the request for extradition." Yet, prosecution may not go forward
81. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 429-30.

82. State v. Pang, 940 P.2d 1293, 1321 (Wash. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 628
(1997).
83.
84.
85.
86.

Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409-10.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 409-11.
Id. at 430.

87. Id. at 410-11, 429.
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477
cmt. a (1987); See generally Papandrea, supra note 63, at 1187 ("The doctrine of specialty
dictates that once the asylum state extradites an individual to the requesting state under
the terms of an extradition treaty, that person can be prosecuted only for the crimes specified in the extradition request."); David B. Sweet, Annotation, Application of Doctrine of
Specialty to Federal Criminal Prosecution of Accused Extradited from Foreign Country,
112 A.L.R. FED, 473, 517 (1993) ("[1In order to avoid a violation of the doctrine of spe-

cialty.., the prosecution must be based upon the same evidence, facts, or acts as set forth
in the request for extradition."); 21 Tx. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 1765 (1982).
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if the crime charged is not listed in the extradition treaty or in
the request for extradition, unless the surrendering state explicitly or implicitly consents to the charge.89 The United StatesBrazil extradition treaty expressly incorporates the permissive
version of the specialty doctrine. 90 Nonetheless, both versions of
the specialty doctrine accomplish the purpose of the rule: protection against indiscriminate prosecution of crimes unrelated to the
extradition request.
In Pang, the Washington Supreme Court specifically noted
that under Rauscher, "for an extradited defendant to be charged
with a crime, that crime must be specified in the treaty (the approval of which is within the sole discretion of the asylum state),
and be included in the extradition petition (the content of which
is within the sole discretion of the requesting state)."9' The
court's ruling on this issue prohibits post-extradition prosecution
for crimes not mentioned in the warrant of extradition." The
Washington Supreme Court further cited Rauscher for the proposition that it is unreasonable that the asylum country should be
expected to surrender a fugitive without any limitation on
post-extradition prosecution. 3 However, in the instant case, the
request for extradition and the United States-Brazil extradition
treaty defined the limitations on post-extradition prosecution.94
The State of Washington could prosecute Pang for any crimes included in the extradition request and the treaty.
Pang argued that because the order of extradition excluded
the charges of murder in the first degree, under the specialty doctrine the State of Washington could not prosecute him on these
charges. 5 In holding that under the treaty and the specialty doctrine Pang could not be prosecuted for any crime but arson in the
first degree,96 the Washington Supreme Court assumed, without
support, that the doctrine of specialty is exclusively defined as
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 477

cmt. a (1987).
90. Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America and the United
States of Brazil, supra note 39.
91. State v. Pang, 940 P.2d 1293, 1320 (Wash. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 628
(1997) (emphasis added).
92. Id.at 1325 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 1320.
94. Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America and the United
States of Brazil, supra note 39.
95. Pang, 940 P.2d at 1320.
96. Id. at 1325-26.
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limiting prosecution to offenses for which extradition was
granted.
However, in United States v. Saccoccia, 7 the court recog-

nized that specialty "is not a hidebound dogma, but must be applied in a practical, commonsense fashion. Thus, obeisance to the
principle of specialty does not require that... the prosecution
always be limited to specific offenses enumerated in the surrendering state's extradition order."' The Saccoccia court further
stated that the inquiry into specialty is whether the court in the
requesting state reasonably believes that prosecuting the defendant on particular charges contradicts the surrendering state's
intentions ."

In the instant case, the doctrine of specialty is expressly in00
corporated into the United States-Brazil extradition treaty.
However, the Washington Supreme Court in Pang implied additional limitations on prosecution beyond the express specialty
provisions agreed upon by the United States and Brazil. The
court relied on Rauscher.° . for the proposition that an implied
term of every extradition treaty is that an extraditee may be
prosecuted only for crimes for which he was surrendered. Yet, in
Rauscher, the Supreme Court limited its holding as an interpretation of the extradition treaty with England." 2 The court originally looked at the language of the treaty itself.'0 3 It was only after it concluded that the treaty was silent on this issue that the
court in Rauscher looked beyond the express terms of the treaty
to determine whether the parties intended to limit the scope of
post-extradition prosecution." 4 Hence, the Rauscher court turned
to the comity principles in general and the history between the
United States and England on this issue only in the absence of
Thus, Rauscher
express specialty provisions in the treaty.'
stands for the proposition that a court is authorized to look be97. United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 767 (1st Cir. 1995).
98. Id. at 767 (citing United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 329 (10th Cir. 1990)).
99. Id.
100. Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America and the United
States of Brazil, supra note 39.
101. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886).
102. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422.
103. Id. at 410-11.
104. Id. at 411-12.
105. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659 (1992) (noting how the
Rauscher court meticulously examined the terms and history of the treaty between the
United States and England).
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yond a treaty only when the text of the treaty fails to provide expressly for limitations on post-extradition prosecution. Unlike
the extradition treaty in Rauscher, the United States-Brazil
treaty of extradition expressly provides limits on post-extradition
prosecution.'
In conclusion, comporting with the case law, the only limitations on post-extradition prosecution are those contained in the
applicable treaty of extradition." 7 This conforms with Brazil's intent with respect to any limitations on prosecution: "[Pirovided
that the terms of the Treaty of Extradition. . .are respected, it
will be incumbent upon the justice system of the United States of
America to establish a suitable punishment for the crime of arson
in four deaths and the consequences
in the first degree, resulting
10 8
thereof, under U.S. law."
D.

The United States-BrazilExtraditionTreaty
ProhibitsProsecutiononly for Chargesthat are
not Included in the ExtraditionRequest

The State of Washington requested Pang's extradition on arson and first degree murder charges arising out of his act of intentionally setting a fire that resulted in four deaths. 9 It is undisputed that arson and murder are extraditable offenses."'
Case law supports the rule giving effect to the plain language of the treaty and refusing to imply greater limitations on
prosecution in the face of express treaty limitations. The Washington Supreme Court in Pang acknowledged that two circuit
courts have affirmed convictions on charges other than those for

106. Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America and the United
States of Brazil, supra note 39.
107. See United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
108. State v. Pang, 940 P.2d 1293, 1312 (Wash. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 628
(1997).
109. Id. at 1297.
110. See Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America and the United
States of Brazil, supra note 39, art. 11, 15 U.S.T. 2093. Article II of the Treaty states in
part:
Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of the present Treaty
for prosecution when they have been charged with, or to undergo sentence
when they have been convicted of, any of the following crimes or offenses:
1. Murder...
7. Arson....
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which extradition was granted based on the plain language of the
treaties at issue."'
In Fiocconi v. Attorney General, the defendants were extradited from Italy to the United States on charges of conspiring to
import heroin into the United States.112 They were later additionally charged and convicted of the substantive crimes of receiving, concealing, selling and facilitating the transportation,
concealment and sale of heroin in New York."' The defendants
appealed their convictions, arguing that prosecution for charges
other than the conspiracy charge included in the request for extradition was an act of bad faith toward the Government of Italy."" In upholding their convictions the circuit court looked to
the United States-Italy treaty of extradition, which provided that
"the person... delivered up for the crimes enumerated.. .shall in
no case be tried for any... crime, committed previously to that for
which his... surrender is asked.""5

The Fiocconi court further

stated that "if the countries had intended that the requesting
government could not try the accused for any crime committed
before the time of his surrender other than the crime for which
he was extradited, they could have accomplished this by adopting
one of the standard clauses to that end.""16
In United States v. Sensi," 7 the defendant was extradited for
transportation of stolen property and convicted of mail fraud,
possession or receipt of stolen securities in excess of $5,000,
first-degree theft, and transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce of stolen securities and money in excess of $5,000."'
The court in Sensi upheld the convictions on the basis that the
United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty prohibited
prosecution only "for any offense other than an extraditable offense established by the facts in respect of which his extradition
has been granted... ,,"' The court noted that though the crimes
111. See Fioconni v. Att'y Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 481-82 (2nd Cir. 1972); United States v.
Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 895-96 (D.C.Cir. 1989).
112. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 476.
113. Id. at 477.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 481 (quoting Extradition Convention, 1868, U.S.-Italy, art. nI, 15 Stat.
631).
116. Id. at 481 (citing 1 John B. Moore, A Treatise on Extradition and Interstate
Rendition §§ 148-49, at 194-96 (1891)).
117. United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 895-96 (D.C.Cir. 1989).
118. Id. at 891-92.
119. Id. at 895 (quoting Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. XII, 28
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charged were not those for which extradition was granted, they
were based on the same underlying facts, and therefore, complied
with the specialty provisions in the extradition treaty"' Similarly, had United States and Brazil intended to limit prosecution
only for crimes included in the grant of extradition, they could
have used language in the treaty to that end.
The court in Pang cited United States v. Khan 12 1 for the

proposition that a fugitive cannot be prosecuted for offenses other
than those for which extradition was granted. 2' In Khan the defendant was charged in the United States with conspiracy to import heroin (Count II) and use of a communication facility to facilitate the heroin conspiracy (Count VIII)."3 A jury found Khan

guilty of both counts.'24 Khan argued that the Pakistani extradition documents referred only to the conspiracy charge and therefore his conviction on Count VIII should be dismissed.'25 The
Khan court agreed and held that because Pakistan did not agree
to extradite the defendant on the communications facility charge,
the specialty doctrine had not been satisfied and the conviction
on that charge should be reversed and dismissed. 2 However, the
holding in Khan was based on the express language of the treaty.
The United States-Pakistan extradition treaty contained the following language: "A person surrendered can in no case be [prosecuted]... for any other crime or offence, or on account of any other
matters, than those for which the extradition shall have taken
place." 27
Nonetheless, the United States-Brazil treaty of extradition
provides that: "A person extradited by virtue of the present
Treaty may not be tried or punished by the requesting State for
any crime or offense committed prior to the request for his extradition, other than that which gave rise to the request. . . .""' BeU.S.T. 233).
120. Id. at 895-96.
121. United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1993).

122. State v. Pang, 940 P.2d 1293, 1324 (Wash. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 628
(1997).
123. Khan, 993 F.2d at 1368.
124. Id. at 1368.

125. Id. at 1373.
126. Id. at 1375.

127. Id. at 1374 (quoting Extradition Treaty, Dec. 22, 1931, U.S.-Pak., art. VII, 47
Stat. 2124).

128. Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America and the United
States of Brazil, supra note 39.
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cause Pang was not charged with any offenses other than those
for which the United States requested extradition, and the extradition treaty with Brazil limits the offenses for which a fugitive
may be prosecuted only to those that gave rise to the request for
extradition, Pang's prosecution for murder would not violate the
United States-Brazil treaty of extradition.
V. CONCLUSION

Instead of construing the specialty doctrine as implying additional limitations on post-extradition prosecution, the Pang
court could have reached the correct result by looking to the express terms of the United States-Brazil extradition treaty.
In Pang, the United States requested and Brazil granted extradition for the same criminal act: intentionally setting a fire
that resulted in death. Thus, allowing the State of Washington
to prosecute Pang for murder is not to doubtfully construe the
treaty to prosecute him for an offense that "is entirely different
from the one for which he was extradited.""9 As discussed earlier, this is the unifying purpose of the various versions of the
specialty doctrine.13 ° Therefore, giving effect to the positive provisions of the United States-Brazil extradition treaty does not
violate the State of Washington's obligation to construe treaties
in good faith.
The weight of authority strongly indicates that the Washington Supreme Court was mistaken in concluding that the specialty
doctrine prohibited the State of Washington from prosecuting
Pang for murder in the first degree. Under the Pang court's
holding, the deaths of four firefighters will go unpunished even
though under the laws of both Brazil and Washington arson resulting in death is more severely punished than simple arson.
Unless Pang is prosecuted for murder, he cannot be punished for
the firefighters' deaths because the real facts doctrine in Washington State's sentencing laws excludes from sentencing facts
129. See Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907) (emphasizing that: "a
treaty.. .between sovereignties should be construed in accordance with the highest good
faith, and that it should not be sought, by doubtful construction of some of its provisions,
to obtain the extradition of a person for one offense and then punish him for another and
different offense.").
130. See Johnson, 205 U.S. at 316 (showing concern with the government's manipulation of the extradition process to obtain extradition for one offense as an excuse for obtaining jurisdiction for another).
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that establish the elements of a more serious crime. Thus, the
Pang court's decision to dismiss the murder charges did not further the ends of justice, but violated Washington State's rights
under the United States-Brazil extradition treaty and ensured
that neither nation's will is done by immunizing Pang from liability for the deaths he allegedly caused.
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